

~~TOP SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1959

NOTES OF MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT AT
MEETING ON JULY 14, 1959

Defense

1. The importance of clarifying the mission and authority of NORAD: It does not appear that the authority and organization of the North American Air Defense Command yet adequately reflects its responsibilities. The complex weapons systems it must manage and operate require a higher degree of coordination than is now apparently possible in NORAD's present organization and authority. The need for clarification here is increased by the present development programs in the field of anti-ballistic missiles, where it is important to make plans soon enough for the coordination of Ballistic Missile Early Warning with Air Defense. It seems clear to those who are concerned with the technical problems here that this whole area needs to be clarified.

2. The space program in the Department of Defense may be too ambitious and too costly. I have not seen evidence that it has had the hard-boiled technical review to determine what is realistically possible that has been taking place in the civilian Space program.

3. The Army Ballistic Missiles Agency presents a continuing problem which probably cannot be resolved until a decision is made as to whether the role and mission of the Army calls for a large space program. The Army will have an increasing budget problem to maintain ABMA at the level to which it has become accustomed.

4. The Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in concept and practice, is proving itself. I believe the Department of Defense now has in this office a mechanism for making far-reaching, sound technical decisions about weapons systems, and for making the hard choices between those systems which justify continued development and reduction to hardware, and those which do not. As weapons technology becomes more complex and we have so many multiple programs for the development of weapons, it becomes increasingly important that choices be made among alternatives; else we will have continued great increases in the budget of the Department of Defense.

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Even with the most careful selection of new developments, it may well be that the Department of Defense's total budget may have to increase, but it will increase much more unless there is an exercise of sound technical judgment. Every indication leads to the conclusion that Dr. York and his group can make great contributions here and that the development of the strength of this office can appropriately be encouraged.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

1. In my judgment, the Space Council is demonstrating itself to be a "fifth wheel." Because of its particular make-up, it finds difficulty in doing the kind of analysis and preparatory work which can be most helpful to the President. I recognize fully the reasons which led to the inclusion of the Space Council in the Space Act. It may be impractical to make any move to eliminate the Space Council, but it probably will be necessary to recognize that it is unlikely to fill a major role in management and policy-making in the space field.

2. It is important to find ways of bringing together the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, to work out policies and programs in the space field, but this can probably be done better through direct Presidential action, rather than through the mechanism of the Space Council.

Telecommunications

Instead of proposing further studies of the frequency-allocation problem, I believe it is now important and timely to proceed directly to solve the management problem within Government for frequency allocations. There have been meetings on this problem, under the chairmanship of Gov. Hoegh, the Director of OCDM, who now has the primary responsibility for making recommendations to the President for frequency allocation. He does not have an adequate staff thoroughly to analyze and monitor the Government's own use of frequencies. It is important that he secure the services of a Telecommunications Advisor and that this Advisor be provided with an adequate staff. Alternatively, it might be possible to appoint a Telecommunications Advisor in the Office of the President, taking it out from under the responsibility of OCDM. The important thing, however, is to get a telecommunications manager of both technical and administrative competence, and to provide him with a staff so that the Government

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